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ABSTRACT 
 
Many factors contribute to the determination of top executive compensation. This 
paper explores and examines the systematic difference of high-tech and low-tech CEO 
pays. It examines the relationship between top executive compensation and an 
Organizational factor, a Market factor and an Accounting factor. It tests CEO’s salary, 
bonus, and long-term compensation with respect to corporate reputation, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q, CEO shareholding and firm size. 
The results show that CEOs’ Salaries at high-tech firms shows a significantly 
positive relationship with ROE, Tobin’s Q, and corporate reputation, while only 
corporate reputation shows a significant relationship with CEOs’ salaries at low-tech 
firms. In addition, both the high-tech and low-tech firm executives’ total 
compensation are significantly and positively related to Tobin’s Q, and corporate 
reputation. Similar results are reported with Long-term compensation. In general, 
high-tech firms tend to use more sophisticated performance measures for the 
determination of CEO compensation, while low-tech firms seem to use a simple 
performance measure such as corporate reputation.     
 
Keywords: US CEO Compensation, Corporate Reputation, Accounting Performance, 
Market Performance   
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INTRODUCTION 
 Managers in high-tech firms are faced with different sets of performance 
expectations such as innovation, new product development, integration of technology 
and research and development management. Agency theory in accounting and finance 
suggests that firms should design incentive compensation system such that agent’s 
(manager) interest is in line with principal’s (shareholder) interest. Shareholders 
design the CEO compensation package in order to motivate and monitor managers and 
align managers’ objectives with shareholders’ objectives. Shareholders attempt to 
insure that CEOs act in a manner that maximizes the value of organization, its owners 
and other stakeholders.   
 As compared to low-tech firms, the success of high-tech firms depends more 
upon managing intangible assets such as technology innovation, continuous 
improvement, software development and knowledge-based management. High tech 
firms must continuously innovate to survive and to sustain growth in increasingly 
competitive and global markets. Balkin et al. (2000) have shown that “CEO 
compensation was related to innovation as measured by number of patents and R&D 
spending.” Their findings are very interesting and show an important change in CEO 
compensation which in the past has been heavily tied to accounting and stock 
performance measures. Balkin et al. (2000) study reports an important change and a 
new trend in managerial compensation, relies more on process (innovation) rather than 
financial results such as accounting and market performance measures.  
In today’s competitive market, managers should focus more on managing 
processes which will yield financial results such as accounting and stock performance. 
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996, 1997) have long been argued in favor of a balance of 
various performance measures not a single performance induce goal-congruent 
behavior. They have argued that, to align performance with company’s mission and 
strategies, performance should be measured with a combination of four different 
perspectives; Financial perspective, Customer perspective, Learning and Growth 
perspective and Business and Production Process perspective. Kaplan and Norton 
proposed to use a Balanced Scorecard in evaluating corporate performance. They 
argue that employees’ learning and growth improve organization’s production and 
quality of services. Organizational and production efficiency increase customer 
satisfaction and therefore financial results.  Henderson and Fredrickson (1996) have 
shown that CEOs are “paid for the level of information processing that their jobs 
requires.” Their findings showed that “CEO compensation was higher in firms whose 
diversification strategy, approaches to technology, and top management team structure 
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placed particularly high information-processing demands on their CEOs.”  
This study explores the determinants of the high-tech and low-tech CEO pays. 
This paper attempts to examine how high-tech and low-tech CEO pays are related to 
various performance measures such as corporate reputation, firm size, CEO’s stock 
ownership, ROE and Tobin’s Q. It also attempts to examine the systematic difference 
in CEO pays and the performance expectations of high-tech firms and low-tech firms.  
The results in general exhibit that high-tech firms tend to use a comprehensive 
and a more sophisticated performance measures than those of low-tech firms. The 
salaries of high-tech firm executives show a significantly positive relationship with 
ROE, Tobin’s Q and corporate reputation, while corporate reputation shows a 
significantly positive relationship with that of low-tech firms. For the CEOs’ total 
compensation, Tobin’s Q and corporate reputation show a significantly positive 
relationship with both high-tech and low-tech firms. Similar results are exhibited for 
the long-term compensation.  
This paper makes two important contributions. First, it provides a better 
classification of high-technology firms. Most previous studies (Balkin et al., 2000; 
Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Shim and Lee, 1995) classify high-technology 
industry as an industry with Research and Development expenditure greater than 5% 
of total sales. This classification is based on the industry R&D expenditure rather than 
a firm’s proportional R&D expenditure and can be misleading. Because, with this 
classification, a firm would be classified as a high-tech firm as long as it belongs to an 
industry with average R&D expenditure greater than 5% of sales, even though this 
firm’s R&D expenditure may be less than 5% of total sales. This paper refines the 
high-tech classification. It is not only based on industry-average R&D expenditures 
but based on a firm’s proportional R&D expenditures. That is, in order to be classified 
as a high-tech firm, a firm’s R&D expenditure should be more than 5% of total sales. 
The results of this study would be robust with the refined high-tech classification. 
Baruch survey (1997) showed that a set of 3 criteria were used most often for high-
technology company: (1) percentage of employees with a university degree (more 
than 10%), (2) Percentage of investment in research and development (more than 5%) 
and (3) the area of activity of the organization (industry sector).  Second, this paper 
examines a more comprehensive relationship between top executive compensation 
and corporate performance. It specifically incorporates corporate reputation as a 
possible explanatory variable to the executive compensation in addition to accounting 
and market-based performance.  Previous studies overlooked this important variable. 
This paper will help in filling gap and provide better understanding on compensation 
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and performance relationship. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents a literature review 
and the testable hypotheses. The third section describes the methodology: sample, data 
collection and research methods. The fourth section provides results and analyses. The 
final section presents summary, conclusions and further research issues.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Balkin, Markman and Gomez-Mejia (2000) investigated CEO pay in high-
technology firms. They compared the CEO pays of 90 high-technology firms with 74 
low-technology firms (control sample). By using the number of patents and R&D 
spending as surrogates for innovation, they found that CEO short-term compensation 
was related to innovation and the relationship was ‘less consistent temporal’ for the 
long-term compensation in high-technology firms. For the low-tech firms, no 
relationship was found between innovation and either short- or long-term 
compensation. Their study provides important evidence that ties CEO compensation 
with process and innovation rather than accounting and stock performance. 
Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) have examined a very comprehensive relationship 
between CEO compensation and managerial discretion for the Fortune 1,000 firms. 
Their study showed that “CEO compensation was positively related to managerial 
discretion such as market growth, R&D intensity, Advertising intensity and 
Concentration. They also showed that ROE, firm size and CEO tenure are 
significantly related to CEO compensation. Other studies have shown that other 
factors contribute to the determination of the CEO pays such as internationalization 
(Sanders and Carpenter, 1998), governance structure, ownership structure (David et. 
al., 1998), CEO power and managerial discretion (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).  
Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998) argues that the relationship between CEO 
pays and firm performance is limited because many other variables influence the CEO 
pays. Many previous studies suggest that the explanatory power of the pay-for-
performance sensitivity is relatively low (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). This paper 
attempts to enhance understanding of the determinants of CEO pays in high-tech and 
low-tech industry. This paper fills the gap and extends the Balkin et al. (2000) and 
previous studies by empirically investigating a more comprehensive relationship. It 
specifically examines the relationship between a set of CEO compensation variables 
and a set of performance variables. Most previous studies are missing an important 
determinant of the CEO compensation, corporate reputation. The Balkin et al. (2000) 
study is missing a number of important determinant variables of CEO compensation 
such as stock performance and corporate reputation. This paper is an attempt to 
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provide additional evidence and to examine a comprehensive relationship for high-
tech and low-tech firms using relatively recent data, 1999-2001. Since high-tech firms 
seem to rely more on stock-based performance measures for the determination of CEO 
compensation, the followings are the proposed hypotheses:  
 
H1: High-tech CEO’s compensation is positively related to the market 
 performance. 
H2:  High-tech CEO’s compensation is positively related to corporate reputation. 
H3:  High-tech CEO’s compensation is positively related to accounting  
performance. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample Selection 
Sample firms were initially selected from the “Fortune’s 500 America’s Most 
Admired Companies.” The Fortune provides rankings of the corporate reputation 
according to 6 attributes: (1) Ability to Attract, (2) Quality of product or services, (3) 
Increase in market share (4) Quality of Management, (5) Innovativeness, and (6) 
Develop and keep talented people. The sample, “Fortune’s 500 America Most 
Admired Companies,” is matched with the Forbes “1999-2001 Top 800 CEO 
Paychecks.” This matching resulted in 313 firms that both corporate reputation and 
compensation data are available. The corresponding financial data were gathered from 
Compustat. The 37 firms were excluded form the sample due to lack of data on 
financial performance variables and other variables. Finally 276 firms were chosen 
and utilized for this study, divided into 111 high-tech firms and 165 low-tech firms. 
The majority of total sample firms are in the Financial Services (SIC, 6000-6999) 
industry, 38 firms or 14%, in the Wholesale, Retailers & Food services industry, 24 
firms or 9%. The majority of the sample, 88% of the total sample, 244 firms, comes 
from large corporations with over $2 billion of assets.      
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Table 1-A  Number of Firms in Samples by Type of Industry: 
High-techa  vs. Low-tech 
Industry High-tech Low-tech Total SIC 
Mining & Drilling  3 15 18 1000-1499, 2900-2999
Construction  0 4 4 1500-1799 
Food, Drink, & Tobacco 0 12 12 0-999, 2000-2199 
Textile & Apparel 0 3 3 2200-2399 
Lumber & Wood Products 1 11 12 2400-2699 
Drugs & Chemicals 20 0 20 2800-2899 
Rubber, Plastic, & Leather 1 3 4 3000-3199 
Prime & Fabric Metals 13 3 16 3300-3499 
Machinery & Computer 17 0 17 3500-3599 
Electric & Electronic Equip. 14 0 14 3600-3699 
Transportation Equipments 15 0 15 3700-3799 
Measurement Instruments 12 0 12 3800-3899 
Computer Related Sevices 15 2 17 7370-7399 
Transportation & Leisure Serv. 0 15 15 4000-4700, 7000-7099
Publishing & Communication 0 18 18 2700-2799, 4800-4899
Wholesale, Retailer, & Food Serv. 0 24 24 5000-5999 
Financial Services 0 38 38 6000-6999 
Other Business Services 0 17 17 4900-4999, 7500-8999
              Total  111 165 276   
            a. High-tech counts are firms with more than 5% in R&D intensity  
 
Variable Definition 
Executive compensation is normally separated into salary (SALA), bonus 
(BONU) and long-term (LCOM) compensations. Total compensation (TCOM) is 
measured by the sum of salary, bonus and long-term compensation.  
For the independent variables, a set of proxies for Accounting Factor, Market 
(Stock-based) factor, and Organizational factor has been selected. For the accounting 
factor, Return On Equity (ROE) was utilized for the proxy for an accounting 
performance measure, while Tobin’s Q (TBQ) were used as a surrogate for market 
factor. The ROE is calculated by dividing net income by average balance of common 
stockholder's equity. Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for the book-to-market value. 
Tobin’s Q3 = [MVE + PS + DEBT] / [TA]. Where MVE is the market value of 
shareholder equity (product of a firm’s closing stock price and the number of common 
stock shares outstanding), PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding 
preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short-
term assets, plus the book value of the firm’s long term debt, and TA is the book value 
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of the total assets of the firm. We employed the approximation of Tobin’s Q as in 
Chung and Pruitt (1994), because it only requires data from COMPUSTAT. The 
Chung and Pruitt (1994) study revealed that this approximation of Tobin’s Q has an 
extremely high predictive accuracy when compared to the original formulation 
(Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).  
 
Table 1-B  Number of Firms in Total Sample by Asset Size 
Asset Size Count  
Less than       $   2,000  mil. 32 
$  2,001    -        3,000 30 
    3,001    -        5,000 42 
5,001    -        7,000 32 
7,001    -      10,000 17 
10,001    -      15,000 35 
15,001    -      25,000 28 
25,001    -      40,000 21 
40,001    -    100,000 24 
Larger  than  $100,000 mil. 15 
              Total  111 
 
For the organizational factor, Company reputation (CORU) was utilized. 
Company Reputation is the average score of company reputation composed by eight 
attributes: quality of management; quality of products or services; innovativeness; 
long-term investment value; financial soundness; ability to attract, develop, and keep 
talented people; responsibility to the community and the environment; and wise use of 
corporate assets. In addition, two control variables were used for the analysis. Firm 
size is well documented and researched to have a significant positive relationship with 
CEO compensation in many studies. In addition, the CEO stock ownership is also 
included as a control variable. The CEO Stock Ownership (OCEO) was measured by 
the percentage of outstanding stockholdings by the CEO. 
For the data analysis, descriptive statistics for each variable were computed first. 
Then, Pearson's Product Moment Coefficient of Correlation was utilized to identify 
the intercorrelation among the various measures.  Finally, lagged regression analysis 
was employed to determine the significance and magnitude of the relationships 
between CEO compensation and various organizational and financial performance 
measures. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method was used to estimate the 
regression parameters.   
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The lagged regression models are as follows; 
Ln (SALt) = a + b1 TBQt-1 + b2 ROEt-1 + b3 CORUt-1 + b4 FSIZt-1 + b5 OCEOt-1 
+ e 
Ln (LCOMt) = a + b1 TBQt-1 + b2 ROEt-1 + b3 CORUt-1 + b4 FSIZt-1 + b5 
OCEOt-1 + e 
Ln (TCOMt) = a + b1 TBQt-1 + b2 ROEt-1 + b3 CORUt-1 + b4 FSIZt-1 + b5 
OCEOt-1 + e 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The descriptive statistics of the variables for high-tech firms are presented in the 
Table 2-A and Low-tech firms are in the Table 2-B. Mean total compensation for the 
high-tech CEO in 2000 and in 2001 was about $16.4 million and $13.3 million, while 
the low-tech firms’ mean total compensation is $7.5 million and $8.4 million 
respectively. This indicates that high-tech firms’ executives are receiving substantially 
higher total compensation than that of the low-tech counterparts. In addition, high-
tech firms’ CEO pays rely heavily on long-term compensation, represented 86% of its 
total compensation in 2000 and 83% of its total compensation in 2001. On the 
contrary, only 70% of low-tech executives’ total compensation was in the form of 
long-term compensation in 2000 and 68% in 2001. High-tech executives’ cash 
compensation, Salary and Bonus, accounts for only about 14% of total compensation 
in 2000 and about 17% of total compensation in 2001. This means that almost all of 
the CEOs’ compensation is in the form of stock. 
As Table 3-A, 3-B, 4-A and 4-B Indicate, CEO Compensation is highly 
correlated with Firm size in both high-tech and low-tech companies. On the contrary 
high-tech companies’ CEO compensation exhibits a high correlation with CEO share 
ownership, while low-tech companies’ CEO compensation is highly correlated with 
Company reputation. This difference is would be investigated further.   
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Table 2-A Descriptive Statistics: High-tech vs. Low-techa (Year 1999-2000) 
            High-tech               Low-tech 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
Salaryb  878.13 345.82   860.58 305.27
Salary & Bonusb 2,132.31 1,411.09  2,280.14 2,029.87
Long-term Comp. b 14,278.33 63,245.05  5,206.31 15,989.93
Total Compensationb 16,410.64 63,633.00  7,486.45 17,026.40
ROE 19.62 31.79  9.59 74.44
Tobin's Q 3.13 3.46  1.55 1.81
Company Reputation 6.41 0.99  6.32 0.94
Ownership (%) 1.03 3.27  1.88 5.37
Firm Size: Ln (Sales)  8.89 1.00   9.04 1.04
 
Table 2-B Descriptive Statistics: High-tech vs. Low-techa (Year 2000-2001) 
            High-tech               Low-tech 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
Salaryb  884.64 326.16   900.92 338.10
Salary & Bonusb 2,165.23 1,501.14  2,750.05 2,803.71
Long-term Comp. b 11,125.90 30,488.45  5,694.23 18,277.29
Total Compensationb 13,291.13 30,870.35  8,444.28 20,306.54
ROE 12.35 37.34  15.15 25.33
Tobin's Q 2.54 2.44  1.40 1.73
Company Reputation 6.20 0.96  6.12 1.03
Ownership (%) 0.86 3.08  1.74 5.27
Firm Size: Ln (Sales)  8.98 1.01   9.18 1.08
 a. High-tech (n = 111) vs. Low-tech (n = 165)    
 b  In thousands of dollars      
 
Table 3-A Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: High-techa  
(Samples for 1999 and 2000 Analysis) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Salaryb, 2000 878.13 345.82          
2. Salary & Bonusb, 2000 2,132.31 1,411.09  0.639***   
3. Long-term Compensationb, 2000 14,278.33 63,245.05   0.087 0.264**   
4. Total Compensationb, 2000 16,410.64 63,633.00 0.185* 0.285**   0.734***   
5. ROE, 1999 19.62 31.79  -0.030   0.182*   0.023 0.027   
6. Tobin's Q, 1999 3.13 3.46 0.169*   0.187* 0.179*  0.029 0.092  
7. Company Reputation, 1999 6.41 0.99 0.163 0.250** 0.226*   0.230* 0.140  0.523*** 
8. Ownership, 1999 1.03 3.27 -0.115  0.021   0.090 0.090   0.187* 0.191* 0.186* 
9. Firm Size: Ln(Sales), 1999 8.89 1.00  0.572***  0.565***   0.032 0.044    0.069  -0.042  0.407*** -0.053
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Table 3-B Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: Low-techa  
(Samples for 1999 and 2000 Analysis) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Salaryb, 2001 860.58 305.27                
2. Salary & Bonusb, 2001 2,280.14 2,029.87  0.587***        
3. Long-term Compensationb, 2001 5,206.31 15,989.93 -0.058  0.231**       
4. Total Compensationb, 2001 7,486.45 17,026.40 -0.028  0.277**   0.897***      
5. ROE, 2000 9.59 74.44  0.147 0.184*  0.245** 0.176*     
6. Tobin's Q, 2000 1.55 1.81  0.199* 0.176* 0.179* 0.182* 0.194*    
7. Company Reputation, 2000 6.32 0.94  0.063 0.183* 0.168* 0.257**   0.321***  0.541***   
8. Ownership, 2000 1.88 5.37  0.174*    -0.168  0.229** 0.216**   0.098   0.238*  0.002  
9. Firm Size: Ln(Sales), 2000 9.04 1.04  0.419***   0.452***  0.206** 0.226**  0.209**   0.065 0.416*** -0.010
a. n = 111           
b. In thousand of dollars           
 *  p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001         
 
The results of OLS lagged regression analysis are presented in the Table 5-A, 5-
B and 5-C. In high-technology firms, salary shows a significantly positive relationship 
with all of the tested variables; ROE, Tobin’s Q and corporate reputation. On the other 
hand, only corporate reputation shows a significantly positive relationship in low-
technology firms in 2000-2001. Long-term compensation shows somewhat different 
results as compared to that of salary. Both high-tech and low-tech CEO pays show a 
significantly positive relationship with Tobin’s Q and corporate reputation. The results 
of total compensation are almost identical to that of the long-term compensation. 
Given that salary accounts for less than 20% of total compensation, it is not surprising 
that the results of long-term compensation and the results of total compensation are 
identical. The results are consistent with and confirm Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  
The results indicate that high-tech firms tend to use a more sophisticated 
compensation package and rely more on stock based compensation, while low-tech 
firms adopt a compensation package that relies more on a single variable, reputation. 
For the high tech firms, ROE, Tobin’s Q, and reputation show a significant 
relationship with CEO salary, while only reputation shows a significant positive 
relationship in low-tech firms.   
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Table 4-A Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: High-techa  
(Samples for 2000 and 2001 Analysis) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Salaryb, 2000 884.64 326.16                 
2. Salary & Bonusb, 2000 2,165.23 1,501.14  0.328***         
3. Long-term Compensationb, 2000 11,125.90 30,488.45  0.306***  0.463***        
4. Total Compensationb, 2000 13,291.13 30,870.35  0.327***  0.554*** 0.994***       
5. ROE, 1999 12.35 37.34 -0.069  0.065  0.073   0.077      
6. Tobin's Q, 1999 2.54 2.44  0.036 -0.017  0.175* 0.173*   0.097     
7. Company Reputation, 1999 6.20 0.96  0.068  0.261*** 0.297***  0.312***   0.345***  0.171*    
8. Ownership, 1999 0.86 3.08 -0.105  0.012  0.042 0.167*   0.027 0.093 0.199*   
9. Firm Size: Ln(Sales), 1999 8.98 1.01  0.394***  0.342*** 0.164* 0.195*  -0.036 -0.043 0.169* -0.050
 
Table 4-B Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: Low-techa  
(Samples for 2000 and 2001 Analysis) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Salaryb, 2001 900.92 338.10                  
2. Salary & Bonusb, 2001 2,750.05 2,803.71   0.271***         
3. Long-term Compensationb, 2001 5,694.23 18,277.29 0.093  0.687***        
4. Total Compensationb, 2001 8,444.28 20,306.54 0.122  0.756*** 0.994***       
5. ROE, 2000 15.15 25.33 0.076  0.073  0.061 0.165*      
6. Tobin's Q, 2000 1.40 1.73 0.080  0.001  0.168*  0.243**  0.141     
7. Company Reputation, 2000 6.12 1.03 0.139  0.284*** 0.256***  0.269*** -0.011 0.128    
8. Ownership, 2000 1.74 5.27  -0.059 -0.007 -0.015  -0.014 -0.018 0.031 0.207**   
9. Firm Size: Ln(Sales), 2000 9.18 1.08    0.331***  0.404*** 0.264***  0.293*** -0.046 -0.083 0.238**-0.038
a. n = 165           
b. In thousand of dollars           
 *  p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001         
 
                 Table 5-A Results of OLS Lagged Regression Analysis for Salarya 
 Year (1999-2000) Year (2000-2001) 
Variables    High-techb     Low-techc   High-techb Low-techc    
ROE -0.012(.003) -0.092(.132) 0.208(.087)* 0.068(.048) 
Tobin’s Q 0.020(.015) 0.013(.035) 0.158(.042)* 0.018(.012)* 
Reputation 0.214(.009)** 0.212(.042)** 0.147(.038)* 0.159(.042)** 
CEO Ownership -0.137(.045)* -0.175(.063)* -0.234(.101)* -0.153(.013)*   
Firm Size 0.452(.120)*** 0.303(.102)*** 0.441(.102) *** 0.280(.027)** 
Adjusted R2 0.242 0.219 0.327 0.264 
F-Ratio 4.210*** 3.569** 6.682*** 4.258*** 
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Table 5-B Results of OLS Lagged Regression Analysis for Long-term Compensationa 
 Year (1999-2000) Year (2000-2001) 
Variables    High-techb     Low-techc   High-techb Low-techc    
ROE  -0.014(.012) -0.041(.010) 0.091(.048) 0.083(.051) 
Tobin’s Q 0.198(.082)* 0.198(.082)* 0.188(.043)* 0.148(.052)* 
Reputation 0.270(.052)** 0.212(.042)** 0.125(.033)*   0.244(.073)** 
CEO Ownership -0.154(.071)* 0.021(.013) -0.238(.058)* -0.102(.086)  
Firm Size 0.228(.178)** 0.187(.079)* 0.186(.078)*   0.264(.102)** 
Adjusted R2 0.319 0.220 0.304 0.235 
F-Ratio 5.025*** 4.433*** 6.114*** 5.612*** 
 
 
Table 5-C Results of OLS Lagged Regression Analysis for Total Compensationa 
 Year (1999-2000) Year (2000-2001) 
Variables    High-techb     Low-techc   High-techb Low-techc    
ROE   0.081(.037) 0.039(.010) 0.102(.081) 0.070(.043) 
Tobin’s Q 0.182(.074)** 0.176(.073)* 0.271(.058)** 0.185(.087)* 
Reputation 0.329(.112)*** 0.212(.042)** 0.246(.065)** 0.249(.102)** 
CEO Ownership -0.104(.075) -0.022(.018) 0.198(.051) 0.069(.038) 
Firm Size 0.301(.151)** 0.143(.052)* 0.298(.101)** 0.286(.021)** 
Adjusted R2 0.287 0.225 0.328 0.219 
F-Ratio 4.819*** 4.012** 6.856*** 5.120** 
a. Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients; Standard error s are in parentheses. 
* P <  0.05  ** P <  0.01 *** P  <0.001 
b. High-tech industry (n=111)  
c. Low-tech industry (n=165) 
d. Total sample including High-tech and Low-tech industry (n=276) 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH ISSUES 
This paper reports the results of a recent empirical study of the determinants of 
CEO compensation in high-tech and low-tech firms. This paper finds that CEO 
compensation at high-tech firms relies more on corporate reputation and use a more 
sophisticated performance measures for the determination of the CEO compensation.  
This line of research can be extended to include other countries’ sample and can also 
be conducted with an industry-specific sample. The examination of the performance 
and compensation relationship with a specific industry would add to the understanding 
of the relationship. Comparative studies with other countries, such as Germany and 
Japan, would enlighten the linkage of compensation and a set of performance 
variables in different economic environments, since companies compete globally. It 
would be a new and important line of research, if we examine the relationship for 
other countries such as Japan and Germany (Barkema and Gomex-Mejia, 1998).  In 
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addition, other performance indicators should be examined in order to better 
understand the determinants of CEO compensation. For example, is CEO 
compensation tied to Customer satisfaction measures or Employee productivity and 
efficiency?  Are Production and organization effectiveness and efficiency matter for 
CEO compensation?  A more comprehensive examination will increase the 
understanding of the performance and compensation relationship.  
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